While public discussion of HR 2454 (the "Waxman Markey" bill) has focused on the cap-andtrade program that would be established for carbon emissions, the bill also includes provisions that would tighten energy efficiency standards for consumer appliances. Supporters argue that appliance standards help address a number of market failures. In particular, many studies have pointed out that landlords may buy cheap inefficient appliances when their tenants pay the utility bill. Although this landlord-tenant problem has been widely discussed in the literature, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of the distortion. This paper compares appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and renters using household-level data from the Residential Energy Consumption Survey. The results show that, controlling for household income and other household characteristics, renters are significantly less likely to have energy efficient refrigerators, clothes washers and dishwashers.
Introduction
While public discussion of HR 2454 (the "Waxman Markey" bill) has focused on the cap-andtrade program that would be established for carbon emissions, the bill also includes provisions that would tighten energy efficiency standards for consumer appliances. Appliance standards have been used in the United States since the 1970s and currently standards are in place for dozens of different appliance types. There is an important tradeoff inherent with standards. A standard truncates the market, removing goods that are preferred by some buyers. This cost must be balanced against potential benefits. In particular, supporters of standards argue that they help address a number of market failures that would not be addressed by a cap-and-trade program alone.
One frequently discussed example is the landlord-tenant problem. Many studies have pointed out that landlords may buy cheap inefficient appliances when their tenants pay the utility bill.
Although investments in energy efficient appliances could, in theory, be passed on in the form of higher rents, it may be difficult for landlords to effectively convey information about the efficiency characteristics of appliances. Landlords have an incentive to inform tenants about energy efficient appliances. However, it may be difficult for tenants to evaluate these claims because most tenants are not experienced in evaluating the energy efficiency of appliances. Moreover, old energy bills are typically of limited value in evaluating claims from landlords because appliance utilization varies across households.
The landlord-tenant problem and other principal-agent problems are important to consider when designing carbon policy. Cap-and-trade programs work by increasing the price of energy, causing agents to internalize the social damages from their choices. Principal-agent problems reduce the effectiveness of this approach because the person experiencing these increased prices may not be the same person who is making decisions about energy use. For example, landlords may continue to purchase inefficient appliances even as their tenants' energy bills increase. In short, it may not be enough to simply put a price on carbon and the presence of principal-agent problems in addition to environmental externalities may justify combining appliance standards with cap-and-trade.
The landlord-tenant problem has been widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Blumstein, Krieg, and Schipper, 1980; Fisher and Rothkopf, 1989; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Nadel, 2002; and Gillingham, Newell and Palmer, 2009 ), but its practical importance has yet to be determined empirically. Understanding the mechanisms that explain this behavior and the magnitude of the distortion is important for determining how to most effectively target policies. This paper compares appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and renters using household-level data from a nationally-representative survey, the Residential Energy Consumption Survey. The results show that renters are significantly less likely to report having energy efficient refrigerators, clothes washers, and dishwashers. Differences are large in magnitude and remain after controlling for household income, demographics, energy prices, weather, and other controls. The results imply nationwide an annual increase in energy consumption of approximately nine trillion btus, equivalent to 165,000 tons of carbon emissions annually.
The paper focuses on a set of appliances which together represent about one-fourth of energy consumption in rental housing units. 1 There is reason to believe, however, that the other threefourths (mostly heating and cooling) is also subject to the landlord-tenant problem. The agency issues with building energy efficiency may actually be worse than with appliances. Although it is relatively easy to verify that a dishwasher is energy efficient, it requires considerably more expertise to verify investments in, e.g. roof insulation or heating and cooling ductwork. Given pending legislation aimed at weatherization, an important priority for future work is to examine directly this broader class of energy efficient investments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background information about energy efficiency standards in the United States and describes the data. Section 3 describes the estimating equation used to test for differences in appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and renters. Results are presented and discussed. Section 4 calculates the total energy consumption, expenditure, and carbon emissions implied by the estimates and Section 5 concludes. With any self-reported information there is reason to be concerned about accuracy. 6 Perhaps most problematic for this analysis, it would seem reasonable to believe that homeowners may be better informed than renters about whether or not their appliances are Energy Star. This could provide an alternative explanation for the finding that homeowners are more likely to report having Energy Star appliances. In light of these concerns, the following analysis also examines two alternative measures of energy efficiency. Results are generally similar for these alternative measures, suggesting that the results are not entirely driven by misreporting.
Background and Data
First, in addition to asking whether or not a household's clothes washer is Energy Star, RECS asks if the clothes washer is "front loading" or "top loading". As described in detail in Davis (2008) , front-loading clothes washers tumble clothes on a horizontal axis through a pool of water at the bottom of the tub, using about 50 percent less energy per cycle than conventional washers. Thus "front loading" is an excellent proxy for energy efficiency and, importantly, whether the clothes washer is front loading is likely to be salient to both homeowners and renters.
Second, results are reported for energy efficient lighting. After asking how many lights the household typically uses the survey asks, "How many of these lights use energy efficient bulbs? An energy efficient bulb is a fluorescent tube or a compact fluorescent bulb that costs more than a regular bulb but is one that lasts much longer." The measure used in the analysis is whether or not the household reports having any energy efficient light bulbs though results are similar for the percentage of light bulbs that are energy efficient. 6 The fraction Energy Star in the RECS corresponds poorly to fraction Energy Star in appliance sales data from DOE. For example, in the RECS among households with appliances less than four years old the percentage of households who report owning an Energy Star appliance is 58 percent for refrigerators, 63 percent for dishwashers, 30 percent for room air-conditioners, and 59 percent for clothes washers. In contrast, the DOE reports that the percentage Energy Star among appliances sold in 2005 was 33 percent for refrigerators, 82 percent for dishwashers, 52 percent for room air-conditioners, and 36 percent for clothes washers. These percentages are based on sales data reported to DOE by retail partners. DOE warns users that the set of retail partners changes from year to year, and urges caution in using these data, particularly for making comparisons across years. Table 1 Nine percent of homeowners report having a front loading washer compared to only two percent for renters. For room air conditioners the pattern is reversed, with more renters reporting Energy Star units. This primarily reflects the higher saturation levels of room air conditioners among renters.
Descriptive Statistics
In addition, room air conditioners are somewhat different because they are often owned by renters.
Whereas it would be unusual for a tenant to install his/her own refrigerator or clothes washer in a rental unit, room air conditioners are relatively portable and can be easily installed.
Comparison of means provides an important baseline. However, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions on the basis of the evidence in Table 1 . Although the differences for energy efficient technologies are consistent with the landlord-tenant problem, this pattern could also be driven by other factors such as household income that are correlated with homeownership. The analysis that follows adopts a regression framework, comparing the saturation of energy efficient technologies between homeowners and renters while controlling for household income and other household characteristics. It is worth emphasizing that although the means for many of the characteristics are very different, there is a fair degree of overlap between homeowners and renters. Consider household income, for example. Although mean annual household income is very different ($55,700 for homeowners compared to $34,200 for renters) there are a reasonable number of renters (291 out of 1219) with household income higher than the median household income for homeowners, and a reasonable number of homeowners (895 out of 2979) with household income lower than the median household income for renters. This lends credibility to the regression framework and its ability to effectively control for the observable differences between groups. Table 2 presents estimates from a linear probability model of the following form, Table 2 reports estimates of β 1 from four difference specifications ranging from no controls in column (1) to the complete vector of covariates X i in column (4) including household income (cubic), household demographics including indicators for whether the household head is employed and whether the household receives welfare benefits, indicator variables for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6+ household members, the age of the household head, and indicators for whether the household has children and whether the household head is non-white, as well as electricity prices (cubic), heating and cooling degree days (cubics), Census division, and available state indicators. One of the important reasons why it is important to control for these household characteristics is that homeowners and renters may differ in the level of utilization of appliances. Households with high utilization levels have more to gain from adoption of energy efficient technologies (Hausman and Joskow, 1982) because the savings are larger.
Regression Results
Consider first the estimates for refrigerators. In column (1) without controls, renters are 6.7
percentage points less likely to report having energy efficient refrigerators. This difference is identical to the difference in sample means in Table 1 . Controlling for household income decreases the point estimate corresponding to 1(renter ), consistent with high-income households being both more likely to be homeowners and more likely to own energy efficient refrigerators. Adding additional controls in columns (3) and (4) increases the point estimates to 5.6 and then back to 6.7 percentage points.
For dishwashers without controls the difference is 10.0 percentage points. This is relatively large compared to the sample mean of 25 percent. As with refrigerators, the point estimate decreases after adding income and then increases again after adding additional controls. Homeowners tend to be older, face lower electricity prices, and live in rural and suburban areas; all characteristics that tend to decrease the probability that a household reports having energy efficient appliances.
Estimates for room air conditioners and clothes washers are also negative though consistently smaller than the coefficients for refrigerators and dishwashers. As mentioned above, room air conditioners are relatively portable, potentially mitigating the landlord-tenant problem. Point estimates for front loading clothes washers are negative, precisely estimated, and large relative to the sample mean of eight percent. Finally, the estimate for lighting in the full specification is 4.9 percentage points, compared to the somewhat larger sample mean of 39 percent. With lighting it is relatively easy for a tenant to move into a rental unit and replace incandescent light bulbs with energy efficient light bulbs. On the other hand, the cost savings from energy efficient lighting are accrued over many years and there may be moving costs or other factors that prevent renters from taking energy efficient light bulbs with them with them when they move.
Discussion of Alternative Possible Explanations
These results demonstrate a consistent pattern of renters being less likely to report having energy efficient technologies. Although these results are consistent with the landlord-tenant problem, it is important to consider possible alternative explanations.
First, the differences could reflect landlords choosing not to invest in energy efficient technologies because appliances may have a shorter lifespan in renter occupied units. Because they do not own the appliances, renters may treat appliances more roughly (e.g. slamming doors, breaking refrigerator shelves) increasing the wear and tear on appliances eventually leading to them needing to be replaced. If this behavior is prevalent, landlords would then efficiently choose less expensive appliances. Similarly, landlords may be concerned about possible theft of appliances. This might be particularly problematic for lighting, with expensive light bulbs likely to disappear when renters move out.
Second, the differences could reflect unobserved differences between homeowners and renters in taste for green products. Suppose that, controlling for observables, homeowners receive a warm glow from using an energy efficient technology but renters do not. Alternatively, it could be that controlling for observables, homeowners have stronger tastes for certain appliance characteristics that are correlated with energy efficiency. These differences in taste could lead landlords to efficiently invest less in energy efficient technologies. For tastes to explain these findings, this preference for "green" would need to be imperfectly correlated with household income and other control variables, and positively correlated with home ownership.
The following subsection reports the results from alternative specifications aimed at evaluating these and other possible alternative explanations. Many of these specifications add additional controls, and, for the most part, the basic pattern of renters being less likely to have energy efficient technologies is not sensitive to the addition of these controls. Although it is impossible to definitively rule out possible alternative explanations, the fact that the results are robust across alternative specifications lends support to the interpretation of these estimates as evidence of the landlord-tenant problem. Table 3 reports results from the baseline specification and 13 alternative specifications. The dependent variable is indicated in the top of each column. For example, in column (1) the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the household has an Energy Star refrigerator. All specifications control for household income (cubic) and other household demographics, as well as electricity prices (cubic), heating and cooling degrees (cubics), Census division, and available state indicators as in column (4) of Table 2 .
Alternative Specifications
Row (A) reports the baseline specification. For row (B) the model is estimated using a logit model. Average marginal effects are reported and are very similar to the baseline estimates. Row (C) excludes households that "don't know" if their appliance is Energy Star. In the baseline specification these households are treated as not having Energy Star appliances, and this choice does not seem to be driving the results. Relatively few households answer "don't know" and the fraction is similar for homeowners and renters. For example, for refrigerators 4.0 percent of homeowners and 5.3 percent of renters answer "don't know".
Rows (D-F) restrict the sample to households with relatively new appliances. Again results are similar to the baseline specification, suggesting that the results are not driven by differences in appliance age between homeowners and renters. If anything, the point estimates tend to grow larger (in absolute value) as one restricts the sample to relatively newer appliances.
Rows (G) and (H) report estimates separately for renters below and above the mean level of annual household income for renters. Estimated coefficients are similar for both groups and overwhelmingly negative, providing mild evidence against the "green tastes" explanation. If we thought that the results were driven by taste for green products that is imperfectly correlated with household income, one would have expected smaller estimated coefficients for high-income renters.
Row (I) reports estimates for renters whose utilities are included in the rent. Point estimates are negative and statistically significant for refrigerators, room air conditioners, and clothes washers. This is somewhat surprising because landlords in these units are paying utilities and thus have incentive to invest in energy efficiency. Still, it is important to keep in mind that these households and typically assistance is awarded on a first come-first served basis. For households facing subsidized electricity rates, it makes sense that landlords would not make costly investments in energy efficiency and it is reassuring that the results do not change when excluding these households.
Finally, row (N) excludes households in urban areas in California and New York. Where the rental housing market is subject to rent control, landlords are constrained from making costly investments in energy efficiency because there is no scope for these investments to be capitalized into rents. Rent control is relatively uncommon in the United States, though several urban areas in California and New York have rent controls for some units and it is interesting to see that the results do not change when households in these areas are excluded.
Evaluating the Implied Total Cost
An appealing feature of the estimates in Section 3 is that they provide some of the information necessary to evaluate the overall magnitude of the landlord-tenant problem for an important group of household technologies. This section illustrates how these estimates can be applied, under simplified assumptions, to infer the implied total energy consumption, expenditure, and carbon emissions from the landlord-tenant problem. This preliminary assessment indicates that the total cost of this market failure is not negligible, but that it is small relative to total energy consumption in rental housing units. Table 4 reports the total cost of the landlord-tenant problem as implied by the estimates in the baseline specification. These results are calculated using average annual energy consumption and energy expenditure for Energy Star appliances from Sanchez, et. al (2008) . 7 The thought experiment is to consider how many additional energy efficient appliances there would be in the United States if renters were equally likely as homeowners to have these technologies.
The estimates imply that if renters were equally likely to have energy efficient appliances, in the United States there would be 2.2 million more Energy Star refrigerators, 3.1 million more Energy Star dishwashers, and 6.3 million more energy efficient light bulbs. 8 The estimates imply smaller impacts for room air conditioners and clothes washers. Nationwide this would reduce annual energy consumption by 9.4 trillion btus, reduce annual energy expenditures by 93 million, and reduce annual carbon emissions by 166,000 tons.
To put this in perspective, this is about 1/2 of one percent of total energy consumption in rental housing units. 9 There are several reasons why this is not a larger fraction. First, in this thought experiment the saturation of energy efficient technologies is increasing by only between one and nine percentage points. Although not negligible, this is very different from assuming, for example, comprehensive replacement of all conventional appliances with energy efficient appliances. Second, these end-uses represent only about one-fourth of total energy expenditure in rental housing units. 10 Third, these calculations assume that energy efficient technologies use between 10 percent and 30 percent less energy than conventional technologies. The one exception is lighting, for which savings are larger.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides one of the first empirical analyses of the landlord-tenant problem. Across specifications, the estimates indicate that renters are significantly less likely to have energy efficient refrigerators, clothes washers, dishwashers, and lighting. Taken literally, the estimates imply nine trillion btus of excess energy consumption annually in the United States. More research and better data are needed to fully evaluate this problem. The new questions in the RECS are a step in the right direction, but more information is needed including results from professional energy audits to assess potential problems about the accuracy of the self-reported measures of energy efficiency.
In future work, it would also be valuable to extend the analysis to a broader class of residential energy efficiency investments including building insulation, windows, and heating equipment.
for principal-agent problems in residential refrigeration, water heating, space heating and lighting, concluding that 24 percent of residential energy consumption in the United States is potentially subject to principal-agent problems. This study was part of an international project whose results are described in IEA (2007 Table US12 , air-conditioners, refrigerators, lighting, and other appliances together represent 36 percent of total energy consumption in rental housing units. Space and water heating represent the other 64 percent. Note: This table reports estimated coefficients corresponding to an indicator for renter from 79 separate regressions, all estimated using least squares with RECS sampling weights. For each regression the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one of the household has the energy efficient technology indicated in the column heading. All specifications control for household income (cubic) and other household demographics, as well as electricity prices (cubic), heating and cooling degrees (cubics), Census division, and available state indicators as in column (4) of Table 2 . Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within Census divisions. Note: This table reports the total cost of the landlord-tenant problem as implied by the estimated coefficients in column (4) of Table 2 . Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within Census divisions.
